Mobile devices store a diverse set of private user data and have gradually become a hub to control users' other personal Internet-of-Things devices. Access control on mobile devices is therefore highly important. The widely accepted solution is to protect access by asking for the correct password. However, password authentication is tedious, e.g., a user needs to input a password every time she wants to use the device. Moreover, existing biometrics such as face, fingerprint, and touch behaviors are vulnerable to forgery attacks.
INTRODUCTION
Since the introduction of the first iPhone by Apple in June 2007 touch based mobile devices have become ubiquitous. For instance, the volume of the smartphone market has already surpassed that of the PC market in 2011 [22] . Users often store a large amount of sensitive data on mobile devices. Moreover, with the advent of Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices such as smartwatch, Nest Thermostat [14] , and medical device Bee [3] , smartphones have gradually become the hub of IoT. Specifically, a user could use a smartphone to control her smartwatch, adjust home temperature via rePermission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Copyright 20XX ACM X-XXXXX-XX-X/XX/XX ...$15.00. motely controlling the Nest Thermostat, and view the user's insulin injection data and glucose levels from Bee. Access control on mobile devices is important because having access to a user's mobile device allows an attacker to 1) access the user's personal data, and 2) control the user's other connected IoT devices and access sensitive data on them. For instance, an attacker that obtains access to a smartphone can access the user's sensitive SMS messages, emails, and apps that the user didn't log out, as well as manipulate the user's home temperature via remotely controlling the connected Nest Thermostat.
The most popular method to address such threats is to authenticate a user via password before allowing her to use the device, i.e., the user logs in the device with a correct password. However, users might turn off password authentication because it is tedious and inconvenient [21, 5, 10] . For instance, Egelman et al. [10] showed that 42% of users do not lock their smartphones, and 34% of them do so because locking is "too much of a hassle". Moreover, it is well known that conventional biometrics such as face, fingerprint, and voice are vulnerable to forgery attacks [1, 2, 11] . For instance, fingerprint readers can be tricked by taking an image of the fingerprint, forming a mold, and using wood glue to make a fake finger [11] . Therefore, it is urgent to design secure and usable authentication methods.
A number of recent studies have raised the possibility of using low level interactions such as how a user touches the screen as a biometric signature for authentication in mobile devices [4, 9, 12, 13, 17] . The key idea for such authentication mechanisms is that users produce touch data all the time when using the device so that authentication can be passive, i.e., without requiring the user to carry out any action dedicated to authentication.
However, this touch-based authentication mechanism, like conventional biometrics, is also vulnerable to forgery attacks. For instance, an attacker (e.g., a 'friend' or the spouse of the targeted user) can collect the targeted user's touch data via convincing her to use the attacker's mobile devices and recording her touch data. Later, the attacker can program a Lego robot [19] to replay the collected touch data on the targeted mobile device, which can compromise the authentication system with a high probability.
Our work: In this work, we demonstrate a defense against forgery attacks to touch-based biometric. In particular, we defend against forgery attacks by leveraging the impact of screen settings (serving as a random "secret") on a user's touch behavior. The sensors on the screen of a mobile device record where, when, how fast, and how heavily a user's finger touches the screen. Before the recorded raw data is sent to applications on the mobile device, our approach transforms the data as it passes through the operating system according to a screen setting. For instance, a screen setting of 0.8 horizontal distortion means that a 1.0cm long horizontal line starting at a certain location on the screen is received by the application as a 0.8cm long horizontal line starting at the same location. Due to such modifications, the running applications react differently to the actions of the user. As a consequence, the user will adapt her touch behavior (i.e., raw touch data recorded by screen sensors) in order to achieve the desired application behavior. Ideally, the adaptation is performed subconsciously, i.e., the user does not explicitly notice that the screen settings have changed but still adapts the touch behavior to compensate for this change. We investigate the impact of screen settings on a user's touch behavior and their applications to defend against forgery attacks. First, we find that, when screen settings are discretized properly, a user's touch behavior in two different screen settings is stable, meaning that the behavior difference between two different users in the same setting is larger than that between two different settings for the same user. Stability guarantees that we can distinguish a user's touch behavior from other users'. Unfortunately, stability implies that if we learn a model to distinguish a user's touch behavior from other users' using only a single setting, then forgery attacks that replay the targeted user's data collected in other settings succeed with a high probability. Extending stability, we find that a user's touch behavior in different screen settings is also sensitive, meaning that they have a high degree of separability in the feature space. Sensitivity guarantees that one can learn a model to distinguish touch behavior of a user in two different screen settings, serving as a basis for a sufficient defense against forgery attacks. Figure 1 shows the concepts of stability and sensitivity.
Second, based on our findings, we propose a novel continuous authentication mechanism called adaptive touch-based continuous authentication. Our system consists of a registration phase and an authentication phase. In the registration phase, we sample a set of screen settings in which a user's touch behavior is both stable and sensitive. Then we train a model for each setting s to distinguish the behavior of the user in s from the behavior of the same user in other settings and those of other users in all considered settings. In the authentication phase, we randomly sample a predefined setting and use the corresponding model to continuously authenticate the user in each time interval. Our authentication system can significantly decrease the success rate of an attacker that even obtains the targeted user's touch data in all settings. This is because the attacker cannot know the setting used by our system at the time of attacks and replaying touch data collected in a different setting fails to pass the authentication with high probabilities.
Third, we evaluate our system via collecting data from 25 subjects in five different settings along the X axis and five different settings along the Y axis. We find that users can subconsciously adapt their touch behavior to different screen settings, i.e., the transitions between two settings do not interrupt users nor affect user experiences. Moreover, we observe that our system achieves 0.02 to 0.09 smaller mean EERs than previous work for random forgery attacks and 0.17 to 0.18 smaller mean EERs than previous work for targeted forgery attacks; the registration phase of our authentication system takes a short period of time, i.e., touch data collected within two minutes are enough to train a model for a setting; and our system achieves smaller EERs with more screen settings.
In summary, our key contributions are as follows:
• We demonstrate the stability and sensitivity of touch behavior to screen settings.
• We propose a new touch-based continuous authentication mechanism, which builds on the stability and sensitivity properties of behavioral touch patterns to achieve forgery-resistant touch signatures.
• We evaluate our authentication system via collecting touch data from 25 subjects in five screen settings along the X axis and five screen settings along the Y axis. We demonstrate that our system significantly outperforms previous work at defending against forgery attacks.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Screen settings: Users interact with a mobile device via swiping, clicking, or zooming on the screen. For instance, users often slide over the screen horizontally (e.g., navigate to the next page of icons in the main screen or browse through photos) and vertically (e.g., read webpages, updates from social network friends, or emails), which result in horizontal swipes and vertical swipes, respectively. A swipe is also called a stroke, and we will use them interchangeably in the paper.
The sensors on the screen record the location, timing, pressure, and covering area of interactions. More specifically, an interaction is a sequence of touch points (ti,xi,yi,pi,ai), where ti is the timestamp, xi is the horizontal location, yi is the vertical location, pi is the pressure, and ai is the covering area of the ith touch point. Then these touch points are transformed by the operating system to higher-level primitives such as clicks, swipes, and zooms. Applications on the mobile device access the transformed primitives through the operating system. In the following, touch behavior refers to the raw touch data recorded by the screen sensors.
A screen setting controls how the sensed raw data is transformed to the primitives that are used by applications. For instance, screen settings can independently distort the X (i.e., horizontal) axis or the Y (i.e., vertical) axis. Note that transformation is only applied to a sequence of touch points and the first touch point of any interaction is not transformed. Therefore, one-touch operations like clicking a button on an application will not be affected by different screen settings. Moreover, since screen settings are transparent to applications, application developers do not need to change their applications when the screen settings are modified.
Suppose a user drags a line from position (10, 10) to position (110,110) on the screen. Under a screen setting of 0.8 Y-distortion the application would see a line from position (10, 10) to position (110,90). Under a screen setting of 1.2 X-distortion the application would see a line from position (10, 10) to position (130, 110). To account for such transformations, the user will adapt her touch behavior to achieve the desired application behavior. Touch-based continuous authentication: Touch-based authentication has been proposed first in [9] and [16] . However, both methods require the user to carry out a specific secret gesture at a defined point of time (unlock challenge) and then analyze how the gesture is carried out. More recently, leveraging a user's touch interactions obtained when the user interacts with the device to continuously and implicitly monitor the user has attracted increasing attentions. Complex interactions such as zooming are too infrequently used to be appropriate for continuous monitoring and clicks exhibit too few features to be discriminative for users. Therefore, most previous work focus on swiping interactions (i.e., strokes), which were demonstrated to contain a behavioral biometric signature that may be used to continuously authenticate the user [4, 12, 13, 17, 20] .
For instance, Frank et al. [12] extracted 31 features from each stroke and trained a classifier for a user to distinguish her touch behavior from other users'. These features include the direction of the end-to-end line, average velocity, start locations, and end locations of a stroke. For a complete list of the features, please refer to Frank et al. [12] . More recently, Sae-Bae et al. [18] studied a canonical set of 22 multitouch gestures for authentication on mobile devices, and they found a desirable alignment of usability and security, i.e., gestures that are more secure are rated by users as more usable. Sherman et al. [20] proposed to use free gestures as a static authenticator to unlock mobile devices and they further studied the memorability of user generated gestures. Xu et al. [23] verified that touch-based authentication is a promising authenticator via conducting experiments with around 30 users for one month in the wild.
However, all these touch-based authentication mechanisms consider a single universal screen setting (e.g., the default screen setting) for all users, making them vulnerable to forgery attacks which collect a user's touch strokes in the screen setting and program a robot to replay them to attack the authentication system (please see more details in Section 6). Our work also focuses on users' strokes, but we leverage multiple, randomly chosen screen settings. Common-behavior attacks: Serwadda and Phoha [19] showed that a Lego robot can be programmed to swipe the screen of a mobile device, and the stroke recorded by the screen sensors is as desired. Please note that to forge a desired stroke via programming the robot, the attacker needs to know the defining parameters of the stroke, such as the start and stop locations.
Moreover, they proposed that the attacker can simply program the robot to replay the common touch behavior of a large population onto the targeted user's mobile device, and they showed that such common-behavior attacks can significantly increase the EERs. However, they also showed that their common-behavior attacks have limited success rates for users whose behaviors are relatively far from the common, and there are about 20-40% of such users. This means that touch-based authentication is appropriate to these users. In practice, touch-based authentication systems can compare a user's touch behavior to those of a large population and recommend if the behavior is far enough from the common behaviors so that it is resilient to common-behavior attacks.
In this work, we consider stronger forgery attacks in which the attacker could obtain the targeted user's touch data and program a robot to replay them.
THREAT MODEL
The authentication system is available to the attacker.
The attacker can read and analyze the implementation details of the authentication system offline. Therefore, if the authentication system uses an universal screen setting (e.g., the default screen setting) for all users, the attacker can obtain this setting via offline code analysis. However, we assume that the attacker cannot obtain the dynamic behaviors of the authentication system that runs on the targeted user's mobile device. For instance, the attacker cannot know the current setting used by the authentication system if it is randomly sampled in random time intervals. This is because reading out the current settings at runtime requires high privileges (e.g., root access to the operating system) and an attacker that has already obtained such high privileges already compromised the system.
We assume the attacker has a commercialized programmable robot (e.g., a Lego robot), which can be used to forge touch strokes and play them on mobile devices. For instance, Serwadda and Phoha [19] showed how to program a Lego robot to forge touch strokes to have desired features. We note that an intelligent robot which is equipped with specialized sensors could potentially detect the current screen setting used by our authentication system using advanced computer vision algorithms. However, the attacker might not have such a specialized robot, and thus, in this work, we consider stateof-the-art commercialized robots, with which the attacker cannot infer the current screen setting.
We consider two general forgery attacks depending on whether the attacker obtains touch strokes of the targeted user or not.
Random attacks: In this scenario, the attacker does not obtain touch strokes of the targeted user. For instance, this could be the case in which the targeted user lost the device and it is found by a random attacker, who does not know the targeted user and does not have its touch strokes. However, the attacker could obtain touch strokes of a set of other users. This is reasonable because 1) the attacker can retrieve touch strokes from publicly accessible data sets [12, 19] , and 2) it is possible that users (intentionally or unintentionally) install an application (e.g., this application is a fun game application and does not appear to be malicious) that is developed by the attacker on their mobile devices and the application records users' touch strokes.
After obtaining touch strokes from a set of users in different screen settings, the attacker randomly selects touch strokes, programs a robot to forge them [19] , and uses the robot to touch the mobile device.
Targeted attacks: In this case, the attacker obtains touch strokes of the targeted user. For instance, the attacker could be a "friend" of the targeted user or the targeted user's curious spouse, who wants to access the messages sent by the targeted user or wants to know whom the targeted user has called, and the attacker convinces the targeted user to use her mobile devices to record touch strokes. Again, the attacker programs a robot using the collected strokes to attack the targeted user. Intuitively, if the authentication system uses an universal screen setting, the attacker can obtain the targeted user's strokes in this universal setting, which results in attacks with very high success rates (see Section 6). Our new authentication mechanism uses multiple screen settings in which a user's touch behavior is different, and we randomly sample one of the screen settings in each time interval. Given enough settings, our system can significantly decrease the success rates of targeted attacks even if the attacker obtains the targeted user's touch strokes in all screen settings. This is because the attacker cannot know the screen setting used by our authentication system at the time of attack, and thus the attacker does not know which strokes should be used to program the robot. Therefore, the attack is reduced to randomly guess a setting s, but replaying strokes collected in s passes the authentication with much lower probabilities if s is not the current setting used by our authentication system.
STABILITY AND SENSITIVITY
Before introducing our adaptive touch-based continuous authentication system, we introduce two key observations that inspire the design of our authentication system. Stability and sensitivity: A user's touch behaviors in two screen settings are said to be stable if the touch behaviors of the user in one setting are closer to those of the user in the other setting than those of other users in both settings. Moreover, a user's touch behaviors in two settings are said to be sensitive if they have a high degree of separability in the feature space. Figure 1 illustrates the possible outcomes for two settings sa and s b . Intuitively, a user's touch behaviors in two settings become more stable and less sensitive when the two settings are closer.
We find that there exists screen settings across which a user's touch behaviors are both stable and sensitive. For instance, in our experiments (see Section 6), two of the screen settings we consider are 0.8 Y-distortion and 1.2 Ydistortion, respectively. Figure 2 shows vertical touch strokes of three users in the two settings; it is visually noticeable that their behaviors are stable.
Note that a vertical stroke could be an up stroke or a down stroke, which corresponds to scrolling up or scrolling down, respectively. Figure 3 contrasts the start locations (i.e., start y) and stop locations (i.e., stop y) in the vertical direction (i.e., Y axis) of up strokes. We find that their touch behavior are also sensitive. User A (or B) starts touch strokes at similar low y locations in both settings. However, in the screen setting of 0.8 Y-distortion, the strokes interpreted by the application are shorter than the strokes inputed by the user on the screen, and thus the user automatically stops the touch strokes at higher (i.e., larger) y locations, which makes the strokes on the screen longer. User C might subliminally notice the different screen settings, and she tends to start and stop the touch strokes at higher y locations with 0.8 Y-distortion. Implications: On one hand, stability implies that models trained in any setting of one user will always be distinguishable from models trained for other users, clearly separating individual users with high probabilities. This property is needed to successfully authenticate a specific user. On the other hand, if we learn a model to distinguish a user's touch behaviors from other users' in a single setting, then forgery attacks that replay the targeted user's strokes collected in other settings can still succeed with high probabilities. Sensitivity implies that we can train a model to distinguish a single user's touch behaviors in one setting from those in other settings, which makes it possible to defend against targeted attacks. Specifically, when our authentication system uses a setting s, the attacker would fail to pass the authentication with much higher probabilities if the attacker forges attacks using the targeted user's strokes collected in settings other than s.
ADAPTIVE AUTHENTICATION
Our touch-based authentication system consists of two phases: the registration phase and the authentication phase. The authentication system learns user characteristics during the registration phase and enforces these learned characteristics during the authentication phase. Figure 4 illustrates the registration phase. Suppose u is a new user. First, we sample n screen settings across which u's touch behaviors are both stable and sensitive. In practice, we can evenly divide the range of possible screen settings into m bins, and choose the centers of the n bins that are randomly sampled. We denote the set of sampled settings as S(u).
Registration phase
We distinguish two types of strokes: horizontal and vertical, which correspond to scrolling horizontally and scrolling vertically, respectively. The two types of strokes have different features, e.g., the directions of the end-to-end lines corresponding to the strokes. This categorization could enable us to enhance the performance of the system. For each setting s ∈ S(u), we collect a set of touch strokes for each type t (denoted as T (u, s, t)) from u via fixing the screen setting to be s. Then we extract a set of features from each stroke. We adopt the features that are proposed by Frank et al. [12] . The extracted features are subsequently sent to the server. We send features to the server instead of the raw strokes to mitigate the loss from a server compromise. In particular, if we send raw strokes to the server and it is compromised, the raw strokes are easily available to attackers. This is similar to the scenario where passwords are available to attackers when a password database is compromised [15, 8] . However, even if the server is compromised and the features are available to attackers, it is unclear how to forge touch strokes that have these features.
Second, we leverage machine learning techniques to train a classifier for each setting and each stroke type. Specifically, for each setting s ∈ S(u) and a stroke type t, we take the features of the corresponding strokes collected in the set- ting s (i.e., T (u, s, t)) as positive examples, and features of type-t strokes collected in all other settings (i.e., T (u, s , t) for all s ∈ S(u) − {s}) and features of type-t strokes of all users that have already adopted the system as negative examples. Then we learn a classifier c(u, s, t) to distinguish these positive and negative examples. Therefore, we obtain 2n classifiers for the user. The model parameters of these classifiers are then sent back to the user.
Authentication phase
Our adaptive continuous authentication mechanism works on discrete time intervals. In each time interval, we sample a setting s from S(u) uniformly at random and change the screen setting to be s. If the user inputs a stroke with type t, we authenticate the stroke using the classifier c(u, s, t).
Intuitively, our authentication mechanism can significantly decrease the success rates of targeted attacks. In the worst case scenario, the attacker obtained a set of touch strokes of the user in all settings in S(u) and can replay these touch strokes via programming a robot. However, the attacker cannot know which setting is randomly sampled in a given time interval, and thus the attack is reduced to randomly guess a setting and program a robot to replay strokes collected in the setting. Due to the sensitivity of users' touch behaviors, these forged strokes will be rejected with high probabilities.
Note that previous work [12, 13] uses a fixed universal setting for all users, and thus their authentication systems can be breached if the attacker obtains the targeted user's touch strokes in this hard-coded setting. Moreover, we show (in Section 6) that even replaying the touch strokes of the targeted user collected in a different setting can still breach their authentication system with high success rates because of the stability of users' touch behaviors.
A user's behavior is relatively stable over time. For instance, Frank et al. [12] showed that the median EER increases by only 4% when their classifiers are used one week after the registration phase. However, in practice, to account for behavior variety in a longer period of time, we could periodically (e.g., each month or quarter) execute a registration phase to update classifiers. This is feasible since the registration phase takes a short period of time as we will show in our experiments.
EXPERIMENTS

Data collection
We consider five screen settings: 0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2 distortions along either the X or Y axis, and we denote them as sa, s b , sc, s d , and se, respectively. Table 1 shows the notations of the five screen settings. We choose these settings because they are reasonably separable from each other so that a user's touch behaviors are sensitive, yet transitions between them are still unnoticeable to users.
We aim to collect horizontal strokes and vertical strokes in the five screen settings. Moreover, we want to study if tran- sitions between screen settings can be performed without users noticing them. To achieve these goals, we implemented an Android application with two games to record users' raw touch data. Our application uses an Android API to configure screen settings. Moreover, we implemented a library to intercept the raw touch data. Considering user fatigue, for each subject, the ordering of the two games is shuffled uniformly at random.
Task 1, horizontal strokes:
In the first game the user must identify differences between two images. The application shows two versions of one image in a horizontal gallery with a black image in between. The user must swipe horizontally between the images. Figure 5a shows a screenshot of this game. We shuffle the five screen settings along the X axis at the beginning of the game, and change a setting every 30s.
Task 2, vertical strokes:
In the second game the user must identify pairs of images. The application shows five (statically pre-shuffled) pairs of vertically aligned images of different patterns, shapes, and colors. At one given time only one image is visible and the user must move the screen to other images along the Y axis. The static shuffling allows us to compare the same task across different users. Figure 5b shows a screenshot of this game. We shuffle the five screen settings along the Y axis at the beginning of the game, and change a setting every 30s.
We used a HTC One smartphone to collect data from 25 subjects. These subjects age between 25 and 35; and 11 of them are female. Our study was approved by our local IRB. Table 2 summarizes our dataset.
Smooth transition between screen settings: Our authentication system automatically transits from one setting to another in different time intervals. One natural question is that if users notice such transitions. To answer this question, we ask each subject the question "Did you notice anything abnormal?" when he/she finishes the tasks.
We find that no subjects notice these transitions, which means that users subconsciously adapt their behavior to different screen settings and transitions between settings do not interrupt users nor influence user experiences.
Security
We evaluate both random attacks (RA) and targeted attacks (TA) against previous approaches [12, 13, 19] and ours; we explore the impact of the number of screen settings on the performance of our approach; and we study the time required to collect training strokes in the registration phase.
Compared approaches
We distinguish classifiers and authentication systems. Classifiers are key components of a touch-based authentication system, but an authentication system also requires to consider screen settings. We name approaches to train classifiers with a prefix 'C' and approaches to implement authentication systems with a prefix 'S'. Table 3 summarizes the approaches we compare. Classifiers: We compare the following classifiers:
• C-Baseline [12, 13, 19] : This approach considers one setting. To train a classifier for a user u, they take the touch strokes of u in a setting as positive examples and those of all other users in the same setting as negative examples. We use C-Baseline-x to denote their approach in the setting sx, where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}.
• C-ATCA: Our adaptive touch-based continuous authentication (ATCA) considers multiple settings when training classifiers. Specifically, for a user u, we train classifiers for all the five screen settings. We denote them as C-ATCA-a, C-ATCA-b, C-ATCA-c, C-ATCAd, and C-ATCA-e, respectively. To train C-ATCA-x, we take strokes of u in the setting sx as positive examples, and strokes of u in the other four settings and strokes of other users in all the five settings as negative examples, where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}. We adopt Support Vector Machine (SVM) [7] as the classifier in all compared approaches since it was shown to perform well by previous work [12, 13] . Authentication systems: Other than using different classifiers, authentication systems might also have different ways to use screen settings.
• S-Baseline [12, 13, 19] : Their approach uses an universal setting (e.g., the default setting of the smartphone system) for all users. In this case, the attacker can obtain the universal setting, e.g., via reading the code of the authentication system. We further use SBaseline-x to denote the authentication system with the universal setting sx, where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}. Note that S-Baseline-x uses the classifier C-Baseline-x.
• S-Baseline-improved: We improve S-Baseline via selecting a setting from {sa, s b , sc, s d , se} uniformly at random in the registration phase and fixing it in the authentication phase for each user. The S-Baselineimproved system makes the attacker unaware of the setting used for a targeted user.
• S-ATCA: Our adaptive touch-based continuous authentication (ATCA) selects a setting sx from the considered five settings uniformly at random in each time interval and uses the classifier C-ATCA-x to authenticate users, where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}. 
Baseline classifier only using touch strokes in the setting sx, where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e} C-ATCA-x Our classifier for the setting sx, where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}; strokes in other settings are also used S-Baseline-x Baseline authentication system using C-Baseline-x with the fixed universal setting sx, where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e} S-Baseline-improved Our improved Baseline authentication system whose setting is randomly selected S-ATCA Our authentication system using C-ATCA-x, where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}; settings are randomly selected in each time interval
Training and testing
We evaluate the approaches against various attacks via 5-fold cross-validation. Next, we take horizontal strokes as an example to illustrate the details. The vertical strokes are treated in the same way. The set of our subjects is denoted as U d .
We evenly split horizontal strokes of each user in each setting into 5 folds uniformly at random. Let F = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} denote the IDs of the 5 folds. Moreover, we denote by f (u, s, i) the ith fold of horizontal strokes of the user u in the setting s, where i ∈ F and s ∈ {sa, s b , sc, s d , se}.
For each user u, we iterate over i. For each i, we train classifiers as follows:
Training C-Baseline classifiers: To train C-Baseline-x, we use u's horizontal strokes in the setting sx (i.e., ∪ j∈F −{i} f (u, sx, j) as positive examples and other users' horizontal strokes in the setting sx (i.e., ∪ v∈U d −{u} ∪ j∈F −{i} f (u, sx, j)) as negative examples, where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}.
Training C-ATCA classifiers: To train a C-ATCA-x classifier, we use u's horizontal strokes in the setting sx (i.e., ∪ j∈F −{i} f (u, sx, j)) as positive examples. However, we treat u's horizontal strokes in the other four settings (i.e., ∪ j∈F −{i} f (u, sy, j), where y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}/ {x}) and other users' horizontal strokes in all the five settings (i.e., ∪ v∈U d −{u} ∪ j∈F −{i} f (u, sz, j), where z ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}) as negative examples, where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}.
We adopt a Gaussian kernel for SVM and use the LibSVM library [6] to learn the corresponding hyper-parameters via grid search. Each feature is re-scaled to be between -1 and 1. Note that training features and testing features are normalized separately.
Testing: In the test phase, we use u's horizontal strokes in a setting (i.e., f (u, sx, i)) as legitimate (or positive) examples for the classifiers trained for the same setting (i.e., CBaseline-x and C-ATCA-x), where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}. Moreover, we treat other users' horizontal strokes in all the five settings (i.e., ∪ v∈U d −{u} f (v, sz, i), where z ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}) as strokes to perform random attacks; and we treat the target user's horizontal strokes in the five settings (i.e., f (u, sz, i), where z ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}) as strokes to perform targeted attacks.
For each user, training and testing are performed with 5 trials since we have 5 folds, and the results are averaged over them.
Evaluation metrics
Our evaluation metric involves the false-acceptance rate (FAR), the false rejection rate (FRR), and the mean time T required to make the first authentication decision in a session. FAR is the fraction of strokes of imposters that are recognized as strokes of the legitimate user by the classifier.
FRR is the fraction of strokes of legitimate users that are rejected by the classifier. FRR quantifies the empirical probability that the legitimate user must resort to conventional authentication mechanisms. Put in a temporal context, if Ts is the average time between two strokes, then the expected time after which the legitimate user must type in a password due to misclassification is FRR −1 Ts. The two error rates FRR and FAR can be traded off against each other via changing the decision threshold of the classifier. For instance, at the cost of missing out some imposters one can reduce FRR by decreasing the threshold. In order to account for this usability-security trade-off, we report the equal error rate (EER) in all experiments. This is the error rate at the threshold where FAR equals FRR. The maximum value of EER for any authentication system is 0.5, which means that the system rejects or accepts a touch stroke with an equal probability of 0.5.
For a classifier and an attack dataset (e.g., random attacks using strokes collected in sa, targeted attacks using strokes collected in s b ), we compute an EER using the dataset that consists of the classifier's test positive examples (legitimate strokes) and the attack dataset. Intuitively, EER in our context measures the degree of separability between touch strokes of legitimate users and attack strokes. Table 4 shows the mean EERs of our subjects for each classifier and each attack dataset for horizontal strokes. We do not show standard deviations because they do not influence the interpretation of our results. Results on vertical strokes are similar, and thus we do not show them due to the limited space.
Comparison results for classifiers
Diff-setting attacks vs. same-setting attacks: We call an attack a same-setting attack if the attack strokes are collected in the same setting with the one in which the classifier uses. Otherwise, we call an attack diff-setting attack. For instance, random attacks using strokes collected in the setting sa to the classifier C-Baseline-a or C-ATCA-a are same-setting attacks, while random attacks using strokes collected in the setting sa to the classifier C-Baseline-b or C-ATCA-b are diff-setting attacks. Moreover, we denote by RA-xy (or TA-xy) the random attacks (or targeted attacks) that use strokes collected in the setting sy to the classifier that uses the setting sx, where x, y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}.
As we expect, same-setting targeted attacks achieve higher EERs than diff-setting targeted attacks for both C-Baseline classifiers and our C-ATCA classifiers. This is because users' touch behaviors are sensitive. For instance, for horizontal strokes, EERs of diff-setting targeted attacks are 13%-34% smaller than those of same-setting targeted attacks for our C-ATCA classifiers depending on which setting is used to collect the targeted attacks data. Moreover, when the difference between the screen setting used to collect the targeted attacks data and the screen setting of the classifier increases, the EER of the corresponding diff-setting attacks decreases. For instance, for horizontal strokes, the EER of the diff-setting targeted attack TA-ea is 12% smaller than that of the diff-setting targeted attack TA-ba for our C-ATCA classifiers. Our observations imply that users' touch behaviors are more sensitive when the differences between screen settings are larger. C-Baseline vs. C-ATCA: Our classifiers perform significantly better than C-Baseline classifiers at defending against diff-setting attacks. Specifically, EERs of diff-setting random attacks to our classifiers are 1% to 8% smaller than those of the C-Baseline classifiers. For instance, with horizontal strokes, the EER of the diff-setting random attacks RA-ea is 9% for the C-Baseline-e classifier. However, the EER of RA-ea is 3% for our classifier C-ATCA-e, which is 6% smaller than the C-Baseline-e classifier. Moreover, EERs of diff-setting targeted attacks to our classifiers are 6% to 22% smaller than those of the C-Baseline classifiers. For instance, with horizontal strokes, the EER of the diffsetting targeted attacks TA-ea is 39% for the C-Baseline-e classifier. However, the EER of TA-ea is 21% for our classifier C-ATCA-e, which is 18% smaller than the C-Baseline-e classifier. This is because a user's touch behaviors in the five screen settings are both stable and sensitive, which results in high EERs for the C-Baseline classifiers and explains the low EERs for our classifiers, respectively.
For same-setting random attacks, the EERs of our classifiers are slightly larger than those of the C-Baseline classifiers in some cases. This is because our classifiers in a setting s use more negative examples other than the strokes Table 5 : Possible attacks to the 7 authentication systems, where x, y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}.
Random attacks Targeted attacks S-Baseline-x max{RA-xy} TA-xx S-Baseline-improved RA-xy TA-xy S-ATCA RA-xy TA-xy of other users collected in s, which somehow makes their decision boundaries move towards the strokes of other users collected in s, and thus same-setting random attacks achieve slightly higher EERs. As we expect, same-setting targeted attacks achieve high EERs for all classifiers. Specifically, EERs of our classifiers and the C-Baseline classifiers are all close to 50% for same-setting targeted attacks. This means that, for each stroke, the classifier makes a random decision, i.e., it accepts or rejects it with the same probability of 0.5.
Comparison results for authentication systems
We first introduce possible attacks to the considered authentication systems and then show comparison results. Attacks: Suppose the attacker already knows the set of settings {sa, s b , sc, s d , se} that could be used by the authentication systems. Moreover, for a targeted user, we assume the attacker obtains touch strokes of the targeted user or other users in all the five settings. This means that the attacker can perform targeted attacks or random attacks using strokes collected in any of the five settings. Recall that RA-xy (or TA-xy) denotes the random attacks (or targeted attacks) that use strokes collected in the setting sy to authentication systems that use the setting sx, where x, y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}. Note that the attacker does not know which setting (or classifier) is currently used by our authentication system at a given time point.
To attack the baseline authentication system that uses the setting sx (i.e., S-Baseline-x), the attacker can choose to perform the best random attacks (i.e., max{RA -xy} for y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}) or same-setting targeted attacks (i.e., TA-xx) that achieve the highest EERs, where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}. This is because the attacker can know the used screen setting.
To attack S-Baseline-improved or S-ATCA, the attacker does not know the setting of the authentication system, and thus it randomly selects a setting and replays strokes collected in the selected setting. As a result, the 25 possible attacks RA-xy for x, y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e} are performed with an equal probability of 1 25 in the random attacks, and TA-xy for x, y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e} are performed with an equal probability of 1 25 in the targeted attacks. Table 5 summarizes the possible attacks to different authentication systems. EER of authentication systems: For an authentication system and an attack scenario (e.g., random attacks or targeted attacks), we compute an EER via averaging the EERs of the possible attacks to the authentication system, and this average EER is used to measure the resilience of the authentication system to the attacks. Results: Table 6 shows the mean EERs over all subjects for each authentication system and attack scenario for horizontal strokes and vertical strokes.
Overall, we find that our adaptive authentication system achieves the smallest EERs for both random attacks and targeted attacks. Specifically, the EER of adaptive authentication system is 2% to 9% smaller than those of the baseline Table 6 : Mean EERs over all subjects for each authentication system and attack for horizontal strokes and vertical strokes. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. We find that our authentication system achieves significantly smaller EERs than previous work for both random attacks and targeted attacks. and improved baseline authentication systems for random attacks. For targeted attacks, our improved baseline authentication system (i.e., S-Baseline-improved) is 5% to 6% smaller than that of the baseline authentication systems, and our adaptive authentication system further decreases the EER by 12% for both horizontal and vertical strokes.
Impact of the number of screen settings
We show that the EERs of our authentication system decrease when we use more appropriate screen settings. Towards this goal, we vary the number of screen settings and compare the corresponding EERs.
Considering the influence of the difference between two screen settings, we consider two scenarios, in which the number of screen settings increases in different fashions. The two scenarios are:
• Figure 6 shows the EERs of targeted attacks to our authentication system as a function of the num- 1 We also tried the four settings {sa, sc, s d , se}, and we found that the two four screen settings achieve close EERs. Figure 6 : EERs of targeted attacks to our authentication system as a function of the number of screen settings for both scenarios and both horizontal and vertical strokes. We observe that our system can better defend against forgery attacks with more screen settings.
ber of screen settings. We observe that EERs of our authentication system decrease as the number of settings increases for both horizontal strokes and vertical strokes and for both scenarios. This is because, with less screen settings, the performance of our authentication system is dominated by the same-setting targeted attacks whose EERs are high. However, with more settings, the impact of same-setting targeted attacks is smaller, and the performance of our authentication system gets improved. In fact, the probability that same-setting targeted attacks happen is 1 n , where n is the number of settings used.
Learning our classifiers is fast
To learn our classifiers for a user, we need to collect her touch strokes. To study the effect of time spent on collecting training strokes from a new user on the performance of our classifiers, we sample a user and one of the five trials/folds. In the selected trial, we keep the test dataset and attack datasets the same while increasing the positive training dataset (the negative training dataset is fixed). Figure 7 shows the EERs of various attacks as a function of time spent on collecting positive training horizontal strokes. The classifier is C-ATCA-e. EERs of the targeted attacks using strokes collected in the setting se (i.e., 'TA, se') are all close to 50%, and thus are ignored to better contrast the differences of other EERs.
We find that EERs converge very fast. In particular, after 2 minutes (around 30 strokes), EERs are stable or slightly fluctuate. Moreover, after collecting strokes, training a classifier is finished within 1 second.
Summary
Our observations can be summarized as follows:
• Users can subconsciously adapt their behavior to different screen settings, i.e., transitions between settings do not affect user experiences.
• Our authentication system achieves significantly smaller EERs than previous work for both random attacks and targeted attacks.
• Our authentication system achieves smaller EERs with more screen settings.
• Learning our classifiers is fast, i.e., strokes collected within two minutes are enough to stabilize EERs. The classifier is C-ATCA-e. EERs of targeted attacks (TA) in the screen setting se are always 0.5, and thus we do not show them in (b) to better contrast the differences of EERs in other screen settings. We find that learning our classifier is fast, i.e., the EERs are stable or slightly fluctuate after two minutes (around 30 strokes) spent on collecting training strokes.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we design a new touch-based continuous authentication system to defend against forgery attacks by leveraging the impact of screen settings on a user's touch behaviors. First, we find that, when screen settings are discretized properly, a user's touch behaviors in two different settings are both stable and sensitive. Second, based on these findings, we design a new authentication system called adaptive touch-based continuous authentication. The key idea is to randomly sample a predefined screen setting in each time interval. The attacker cannot know the screen setting at the time of attacks. Third, we evaluate our system by collecting data from 25 subjects in five screen settings. We find that users can subconsciously adapt their touch behavior to different screen settings, i.e., transitions between settings do not interrupt users nor affect user experiences. Moreover, we observe that our system significantly outperforms previous work at defending against both random forgery attacks and targeted forgery attacks, the registration phase of our system takes a short period of time, and our system can better defend against forgery attacks with more screen settings.
Future work includes performing a large-scale study about our authentication system in the wild, investigating more types of screen settings, and exploring more advanced attacks to touch-based authentication systems.
